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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
WILLIAM J. HARBISON*

There have been several important appellate decisions by the Tennessee courts in the field of domestic relations during the past year, and
several significant statutes on the subject were enacted by the 1953
General Assembly. These decisions and statutes are discussed briefly
herein according to subject matter.
ANNULMENT OF MAIAGES

One of the most important decisions to be rendered by the Tennessee courts recently in the entire field of domestic relations was
that of the Supreme Court in Estes v. Estes.'
In that case, the parties were ceremonially married in Mississippi
early in December, 1950. They apparently had lived in Memphis,
Tennessee, prior to their marriage, and they returned to that city immediately thereafter. Some three weeks later, the wife learned that
her husband was a party to a prior marriage 'vhich was still subsisting. She immediately withdrew from him and instituted annulment
proceedings in the chancery court. Although the case was uncontested,
the divorce proctor contended that the two-year residence period required in divorce cases when the ground of divorce arises outside of
the State also applies to annulment actions. He also questioned
whether the Tennessee courts had jurisdiction to entertain the action,
since the marriage occurred in Mississippi.
The chancellor dismissed the action on the ground that the two-year
residence requirement was applicable. The Court of Appeals reversed,
and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that
in an outright annulment action the inherent jurisdiction of the equity
court is invoked and that this jurisdiction exists apart from any
statutory requirement.
Like many other states, Tennessee has no separate statutes dealing
with the subject of annulment. One of the grounds for absolute divorce provided in the Code, however, is "that either party has knowingly entered into a second marriage, in violation of a previous
marriage still subsisting. '2 Two other sections of the Code provide
that in a given case the trial court may grant relief by annulment or
absolute or limited divorce, as the circumstances require. 3 Still an* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; former Editor-in-Chief, Vander-

bilt Law Review; associate, Trabue & Sturdivant, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 250 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
2. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8426 (2) (Williams 1934).
3. TENN. CODE AN .§§ 8443, 8445 (Williams 1934).
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other section imposes the residence requirement when the cause of
4
action arose out of the State.
In this important opinion, the Supreme Court pointed out the essential difference between an action for annulment and one for divorce.
The Court stated that if the action were primarily one for divorce, with
annulment asked only as a form of alternative relief, the two-year
residence requirement would "no doubt" be applicable. In an outright
annulment suit, however, the Court held that chancery courts have
inherent power "to declare void that which is admittedly void, both
in law and in fact." Consequently, they are not confined to the statutory restrictions governing divorce suits.
It is elementary, of course, that annulment and divorce are entirely
different concepts. By an annulment, the marriage is entirely erased
and generally is held never to have existed, 5 at least as between the
parties. 6 A divorce decree, on the other hand, merely terminates an
otherwise valid marriage. Marriages are annulled for reasons existing
at the inception of the relationship which prevent a valid marriage
from ever coming into being. Divorces are granted upon grounds
which arise after the marriage takes place.7 The subject of divorce
is entirely statutory; but annulments were granted by the ecclesiastical
8
courts of England long prior to the enactment of divorce statutes.
Unfortunately the Tennessee statutes upon divorce are somewhat
loosely drawn, and at least three of the grounds listed as entitling one
to an absolute divorce have historically been recognized as grounds
for annulment, entirely apart from the divorce statutes. 9 Thus, in the
instant case, prior subsisting marriage was deemed to be ground for
annulment, apart from the divorce statutes, although it is also a statutory ground of relief.
There is no doubt but that the Supreme Court was entirely correct
in holding that annulment is not strictly a statutory subject in Tennessee. Our courts have never felt themselves confined to the grounds
listed in the divorce statutes in granting annulments. Marriages have
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8428 (Williams 1934).

5. Southern Ry. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498 (1939); Millar
v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, L.R.A.1918B 415 (1917); CARUTHERS, HIsTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 621 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951).
6. Saving statutes, such as TENN. CODE ANN. § 8453 (Williams 1934), make
children of such marriages legitimate. Even as to the parties, the marriage may
not be held a nullity for all purposes. See Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 637 (1948). And
as to innocent third parties, the marriage may be given some effect. Sleicher
v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929) (husband of first marriage relieved of alimony payments during period of second marriage of wife, later
annulled). But cf. Southern Ry. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498
(1939).

7. See note 5 supra; MADDEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS 293 (1931).
8. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 44, 263 (1931); 35 Am. JuE., Marriage § 56
(1941).
9. These are impotency, prior subsisting marriage and antenuptial pregnancy by another man. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8426 (Williams 1934). See generally
MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 14, 36, 39 (1931).
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been annulled, for example, upon grounds of fraud, 10 duress" and insanity,12 none of which are listed as grounds of divorce, as well as for
prior subsisting marriage, antenuptial pregnancy and impotency, all
of which are listed in the divorce statutes.
This overlapping of the subject of divorce and annulment because
of the loose wording of the divorce statutes creates real problems
which are left unanswered by the present Supreme Court opinion.
How is one to know whether he is proceeding under the statutes and
is bound by the statutory requirements or whether he is addressing
his bill to the "inherent" jurisdiction of chancery when he seeks relief
upon grounds of prior subsisting marriage, antenuptial pregnancy or
impotency? Does the wording of the prayer for relief control? In the
present case, for example, if the complainant had simply prayed for
an absolute divorce instead of an annulment, would the residence requirement have applied? Under the statutes permitting the courts to
grant the type relief they deem fit, it has been held that the court is
not bound by the prayer and may grant different relief.13 An annulment would have been possible, therefore, in the supposed case, but
would the case have nevertheless been governed by the divorce statutes, with their residence requirement? Or are such cases to be deemed
always to fall under inherent equity jurisdiction? Such problems subgest that the divorce code needs serious revision with a view to separating and clarifying those grounds upon which divorce may be granted
and those for which a marriage may be entirely annulled. 14
The Supreme Court satisfied itself in the present case merely by
holding that there is inherent jurisdiction in the chancery courts to
annul a marriage apart from the divorce statutes. 15 Such jurisdiction
was not exercised by the English courts of chancery, 16 and an early
Tennessee case held that the Tennessee chancery courts have only that
jurisdiction which was exercised by the English courts.'7 In holding,
however, that equity has inherent power to annul marriages, the Supreme Court in the instant case is supported by the great weight of
American authority; 8 and, as already stated, the Tennessee courts
10. See Southern Ry. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498 (1939).
11. Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Tenn. App. 19 (W.S. 1928).

12. See Cole v. Cole, 37 Tenn. 57 (1857).
13. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749 (1933).
14. This situation is not peculiar to Tennessee. In other states with similar
statutory problems, courts frequently annul marriages on grounds which have
historically been grounds for annulment, although the statutes make them
grounds for divorce only.

MADDEN, DoMEsTic RELATIONS 293 (1931).
COMPTON, CASES ON DOMESTic RELATIONS 149 (1951).

See also

15. Only a few states have taken the contrary position. 35 AM. JuR., Marriage § 60 (1941).
16. See Ridgeley v. Ridgeley, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597 (1894); MADDEN, Do-

44 (1931).
17. Oakley v. Long, 29 Tenn. 254 (1849).
18. MADDEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONs 44 (1931); 35 AM. Jun., Marriage § 60
(1941).
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have long exercised power to annul marriages for incapacity despite
the fact that English chancery courts did not do so. 19 The present
opinion is entirely sound, therefore, in recognizing an inherent jurisdiction. It is also in accord with the weight of authority in holding that
the residence requirements of divorce actions do not necessarily apply
to annulment suits.20 It is to be hoped, however, that the Court will
in future opinions clarify the distinction between this inherent jurisdiction and that granted by the divorce statutes, and will point out
more definitely when the statutes apply and when they do not.
With respect to the issue raised by the divorce proctor as to whether
Tennessee had jurisdiction to annul this marriage, the Supreme Court
held that the Tennessee courts had jurisdiction of the marriage status
of the parties and could correct that status, regardless of where the
parties were domiciled at the time of their marriage. There is a wide
divergence of authority upon the subject of jurisdiction to annul a
marriage. 21 It is generally held that a marriage may be annulled only
in a state which has some connection with that marriage, either by
virtue of one of the parties' being domiciled in it or by virtue of having
been the state of celebration of the marriage. 22 The reasoning of the
Tennessee Court in the present case is not clear on this point. Apparently one or both of the parties was domiciled in Tennessee at the
time of filing suit. If so, Tennessee would clearly have jurisdiction to
annul the marriage under the great weight of authority. In dictum,
however, the Court seemed to indicate that Tennessee could grant an
annulment of this marriage because of its illegality and immorality,
regardless of whether either party was domiciled here. Since the marriage was not performed in this State, such a position would seem to
go beyond existing authorities.
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN

In the recent case of Couch v. Couch,23 the Court of Appeals was
called upon to decide the effect of an informal contract of adoption.
The natural father of an illegitimate son desired to adopt the child
without incurring the publicity attendant upon normal court proceedings. Accordingly, in 1929, he went to Georgia and there had an attorney prepare a "Contract of Adoption" under the terms of which the
father purported legally to adopt the child, to give him the family
name and the right to inherit and to assure him of support and mainte19. See notes 10-12 supra.
20. Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, L.R.A.1918B 415 (1917); see
Note, 128 A.L.R. 61, 71 (1940); 35 Am. Ju., Marriage § 63 (1941).
21. For collection of cases, see Note, 128 A.L.R. 61 (1940); 35 AM. JuR., Mar-

riage §§ 61-68 (1941).
22. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 (1934); 35 Am. JUR., Marriage

§ 68 (1941).

23. 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 327 (E.S. 1951).
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nance. The mother of the child consented to this arrangement. No further proceedings were contemplated or attempted. Three years earlier,
in 1926, the father had executed his will in which this child was not
mentioned. The will was never changed. Upon the father's death in
1947, the son claimed a share of the estate under the pretermitted child
statute. 24 The Tennessee courts had previously held that a child
adopted after the execution of a will may occupy the status of a pretermitted child. 25
The Court of Appeals held the attempted adoption ineffective. It
pointed out that there was no common law of adoption and that the
right of adoption is strictly a statutory one. 26 Consequently, there must
be at least a colorable compliance with the statutory procedure in order that the artificial status of adoptive parent and child may be
created. No .attempt was made or intended in the present case to
comply with the statutes of either Tennessee or Georgia.
The Court also refused to permit a recovery upon the basis of estoppel. In earlier Tennessee cases, where there was an executory contract
of adoption coupled with a promise to leave the child a share of the
estate, recovery had been permitted in some instances. 2 7 In every such
case, however, statutory adoption proceedings were intended. There
was no such intention in the present case. Further, in the present case,
the Court pointed out that recovery was allowed in the earlier cases
on the basis of the contract, and not because the doctrine of estoppel
created the status of parent and child. The Court held that the wording
of the contract in the present case was not sufficiently strong to obligate the parent to leave the child a share or to prevent the parent
from disinheriting him.28
The opinion is a very well reasoned one, and the result seems entirely sound. The detailed and elaborate safeguards in the adoption
statutes for the protection of the child and of the natural and the
adoptive parents would have little meaning if these statutes could be
ignored. Regardless of the rule in other states, the Tennessee courts
have consistently held that the only way in which the status of parent
and child may be created by adoption is through a substantial com29
pliance with the statutes.
In refusing to permit the doctrine of estoppel to be used to create
the status, the Court followed a tendency which has become well de24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8131 (Williams 1934).

25. Marshall v. Marshall, 25 Tenn. App. 309, 156 S.W.2d 449 (M.S. 1941).

26. In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S.W. 1097 (1917); Rogers v. Baldridge, 18
Tenn. App. 300, 76 S.W.2d 655 (M.S. 1934); Note, The Tennessee Law of
Adoption, 3 VAND. L. REV. 627, 628-30 (1950).
27. Starnes v. Hatcher, 121 Tenn. 330, 117 S.W. 219 (1908); Adcock v. Simon,
2 Tenn. App. 617 (M.S. 1926).
28. The clause in question stated: "That said child will inherit, from my
estate or estates, in whole or in part, as any other son or child. .. "
29. Note, The Tennessee Law of Adoption, 3 VAND. L. REV. 627, 630 (1950).
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fined in the field of domestic relations within recent years. Formerly,
the Tennessee courts had applied that doctrine to give at least partial
validity to informal marriages, 30 but the present trend of the Tennessee
decisions is to require at least some bona fide attempt to comply with
the marriage statutes before permitting marital rights to be created. 31
A similar rule was applied in the instant case with reference to
adoptions.
In State, ex rel. "A" v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing
Agency, 32 the unwed mother of a child surrendered the child before a
chancellor as required by the adoption statutes. 33 She released the child
to the agency to be placed for adoption. Subsequently, however, she
married the father of the child, and they filed a petition for habeas
corpus against the agency seeking custody of the child. Both the trial
court and the Supreme Court held that the consent of the mother was
irrevocable after thirty days under the statute34 and that the petition
was in effect nothing more than an effort to revoke that consent. The
petition was accordingly dismissed.
The petitioners contended that the child should be placed in the
custody of its natural parents. The Court held, however, that the
primary consideration in awarding custody of children is the welfare
of the child, not that of its parents. The adoption statutes preclude
any question as to the right of the parents to revoke consent for
adoption, once given. The natural parents thereby waive any and all
of their rights to the child. By way of dictum, the Supreme Court
suggested that the trial court might permit the petitioners to amend
their petition and apply for the adoption of the child, but this was
purely a discretionary matter with the trial court.
In its latest session, the General Assembly clarified the procedure
for adopting persons over eighteen years of age.35 The previous statutes
had simply provided that the procedure for adoptions outlined therein
should not apply to such persons. 36 The new provision repeals the
former one and substitutes therefor a more clear and elaborate section.
It provides that persons over eighteen years of age may be adopted
simply upon their own consent, or if the person to be adopted is of unsound mind, then his natural or appointed guardian may consent. The
usual prerequisites for adoption, including the order of reference, social investigation, report of the child-placing agency, waiting period
and interlocutory decree, are all expressly waived.
30. Note, Informal Marriagesin Tennessee, 3 VAMP. L. REv. 610 (1950).
31. Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521 (1951); Rambeau v. Farris, 186 Tenn. 503, 212 S.W.2d 359 (1948), 20 TENN. L. REV. 621 (1949); Note,
Informal Marriagesin Tennessee, 3 VAND. L. REV. 610, 621-25 (1950).

32. 250 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. 1952).
33.
34.
35.
36.

TEN . CODE ANN. §§ 9572.20 et seq. (Williams Supp. 1953).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.25 (Williams Supp. 1953).
Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 171.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.49 (Williams Supp. 1953).
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The General Assembly also enacted legislation more strictly regulating child-placing agencies. 37 The new law repeals all former provisions
pertaining to the licensing and regulation of such agencies. 38 It sets
up minimum standards which all such agencies must meet and requires
that all of them, public or private, must be chartered by the Secretary
of State with the approval of the Department of Public Welfare. Provisions are made for regular inspections and for the revocation of
licenses if suggested corrections are not made within a specified time.
The Act authorizes duly accredited agencies to place children in private
homes for adoption after thorough investigation and selection of such
homes. Private individuals are expressly forbidden to place children
in homes for temporary care or adoption. Administration of the Act is
made the responsibility of the Department of Public Welfare, and
penal provisions are provided for violations.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

In two cases, the appellate courts dealt with procedural points in
awarding custody of children whose parents have separated. In
Branch v. Branch,39 the trial court dismissed a petition for divorce
filed by the husband and also held that the wife was not entitled to a
divorce under a cross-petition. Each of the parties had prayed for
custody of their minor children. Despite the fact that it dismissed both
prayers for divorce, the trial court entered a custody order in the case.
Upon appeal, it was contended that the court had lost jurisdiction and
control of the case by denying a' divorce to either party. The Court
of Appeals held, however, that the trial court is empowered under the
Tennessee statutes to award custody and to retain the cause within its
jurisdiction for further custody orders, even though no relief was
40
granted to either party by way of divorce.
4
In State ex rel. Bolden v. Woodring, 1 the wife sought by writ of
habeas corpus to obtain custody of her minor children from her divorced husband. The divorce court had awarded the children to the
husband. The Supreme Court held that such a collateral attack could
not be sustained and that the only way in which the custody decree
could be modified would be by a petition filed in the original divorce
cause. The case remained under the control of the divorce court under
Tennessee statutes,42 and the Supreme Court simply reaffirmed the
well-established rule that custody decrees must be modified in the
37. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 228.

38. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4520, 4719, 4720, 4720.1-4720.3, 4721, 4722-31, 4734-37,

4739-46 (Williams 1934, Supp. 1953),
4765.93-4765.99 (1950).

TENN. CODE SuPP.

39. 35 Tenn. App. 552, 249 S.W.2d 581 (E.S. 1952).

§§ 4732-4732.2,

40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8454 (Williams 1934) expressly so provides.
41. 254 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1953).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8454 (Williams 1934).
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court rendering them and that no other court could properly take
43
jurisdiction.
In Powell v. Powell:4 the Court of Appeals dealt with the factual
issue of whether the natural father or the maternal grandmother of
two young girls should be given custody. The mother of the children
had obtained their custody when she was awarded a divorce from the
father on grounds of desertion. The mother and children had lived in
the home of the grandmother since the children were born, and since
the death of the mother in 1951, the grandmother had had their sole
custody and care. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in
holding that custody should remain with the grandmother. It appeared
that both parties were proper persons to have the custody, but the
courts declined to uproot the children from their familiar surroundings
and permit them to be taken into another state by a father who had
never supported them or paid them proper paternal attention. Although recognizing the general rule that a father is entitled to the
custody of his children, the Court held that this rule must give way to
the primary consideration of the welfare of the child.4 5
SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
In the case of Watkins v. Watkins, 46 a wife sued her nonresident husband for divorce, service of process being had by publication only.
After entry of an order pro confesso but before any hearing on the
merits, she moved the court to adjudicate as to the future support of
the children of the parties, so that if the husband ever returned to the
State he could be compelled to support them. Both the trial court and
the Supreme Court held that there was no authority for such procedure
but that the matter should await the divorce hearing. Then the decree
in the divorce case could be retained in the trial court for such future
support orders as might be proper.
The wife in the present case could perhaps have proceeded under
the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act hereinafter discussed to require
the nonresident husband to be extradited or else support his children.
Apart from such steps, however, the procedure suggested by the Supreme Court seems to be her only remedy in this State. Apart from
divorce proceedings, the Tennessee decisions have made it very difficult for a child or mother to obtain a decree for future support from
a father, even when the father is personally served with process. Once
he is before the court in a divorce proceeding, support orders may be
43. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341 (1950); Johnson v.
Johnson, 185 Tenn. 400, 206 S.W.2d 400 (1947).

44. 255 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
45. For discussion of the right of the parent in modern law, see Stubblefield
v. State ex rel. Fjelstad, 171 Tenn. 580, 106 S.W.2d 558 (1937); State ex rel.
Daugherty v. Rose, 167 Tenn. 489, 71 S.W.2d 685 (1934).

46. 254 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn. 1953).
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entered by subsequent petitions in the same cause, even though no
support was originally requested and even though the husband has
since left the State.47
The Tennessee courts have, however, denied the right of a child or a
mother to sue the father in an independent proceeding to obtain a
decree for future support.48 Creditors furnishing necessaries to the
child may sue the father for reimbursement. 49 The mother may also
sue to recover her past expenditures. 50 There is no logical reason for
prohibiting the mother of child from suing for future support instead
of compelling such support by the indirect means of procuring credit
and having the creditors seek reimbursement. A great many states
now permit such a direct action,5' but Tennessee still holds to the opposite position. Apparently the Supreme Court felt in the instant case
that a future support order could be obtained by a petition filed in the
divorce case if the husband ever returned to Tennessee.

2

If so, it is to

be hoped that the Court in the future will allow the same result in a
direct and independent action against a derelict parent in cases where
there are no divorce proceedings pending.
The 1953 General Assembly enacted a new and more elaborate
reciprocal nonsupport statute,5 3 repealing a similar one enacted in
1951.54 Essentially the Act provides means of extraditing a nonresident
47. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59 (W.S. 1949).
48. Such a suit was permitted without hesitation in Graham v. Graham,
140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987 (1918). But without referring to the Graham case
the Court denied any action for future support in Fuller v. Fuller, 169 Tenn.
586, 89 S.W.2d 762 (1932), an action brought by the mother on behalf of the
child. Similarly, in Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763 (1935), future
support was denied in an action by the child through the mother as next
friend, again without reference to the Graham case. And in Brooks v. Brooks,
166 Tenn. 255, 61 S.W.2d 654 (1933), and Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn.
517, 160 S.W.2d 406 (1942), the above holdings were deemed to preclude further
inquiry on the point.
49. Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 144 S.W.2d 755, 131
A.L.R. 858 (1940).
50. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341 (1950); Baker v.
Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763 (1935); Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255,
61 S.W.2d 654 (1933).
51. The contrary was formerly true. See MADDEN, DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 392
(1931). But, permitting such direct action, see Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d
326 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Addy v. Addy, 240 Iowa 255, 36 N.W.2d 352 (1949); Green
v. Green, 210 N.C. 147, 185 S.E. 651 (1936), 15 N.C.L. Rsv. 67; Campbell
v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237 (1942); McClaugherty v. McClaugherty,
180 Va. 51, 21 S.E.2d 761 (1942).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8446, 8454 (Williams 1934) authorize decrees for
future support and retain such decrees within the court's control. It was held
before the 1932 amendment to these sections that a wife who sued a nonresident
for divorce by substituted service of process could not obtain alimony from him
when he returned to the jurisdiction, even by petition filed in the divorce proceedings, since prior to the amendments such cases did not remain within control of the court. Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894 (1925).
53. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 188.
54. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 234, codified in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9720.11 et seq.
(Williams Supp. 1953).
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charged in this State with nonsupport of his dependents and for the
return by this State of persons similarly charged in other states. It
also provides that the person so charged may avoid extradition by
agreeing to make support payments through the courts of the state of
his residence, which will transmit them to the state in which the petition was filed. Provisions are made for the exchange of information
and cooperation with states having similar statutes. Orders of support
issued under the act do not supersede prior support or maintenance
decrees, but amounts paid under either order shall be credited against
amounts due under the other to prevent duplicating obligations. All
communications between husband and wife are made competent as
evidence in proceedings under the statute, and spouses may be compelled to testify against each other. Participation in proceedings under
the Act does not confer jurisdiction of the parties upon any court for
any other purpose.
LEGITIMAcY OF CHILDREN

In a very significant decision, the Court of Appeals held that a child
of a void marriage was legitimate. In the case of Taliaferro v.
Rogers,55 the question of the legitimacy of a child of a bigamous marriage was squarely raised. In holding that the child was legitimate, the
Court went far in clarifying the Tennessee legitimacy statutes and in
overturning previous conservative holdings.
There is no question but that bigamous marriages in Tennessee are
absolutely void ab initio.56 They are so entirely void that a decree of
nullity would probably not be necessary, 57 and in all probability ratification of such marriages would not be recognized in this State even
after removal of the disability of the previous subsisting marriage. 58
55. 35

(1953).

Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835 (W.S. 1951), 22

TENN. L. REV. 1066

56. Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521 (1951); Moore v. Moore,
102 Tenn. 148, 52 S.W. 778 (1899).
57. See note 56 supra. Such a decree will be granted, however, because of
the practical importance of a judicial declaration of nullity. Ibid.
58. In states recognizing informal or "common law" marriages, removal of
an impediment and subsequent cohabitation will give rise to a valid marriage
from the date of the removal, when the parties entered into the relationship
with matrimonial intent and in good faith. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68
N.J. Eq. 414, 59 Atl. 813 (1905); MADDEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS 73 (1931); see
Note, 104 A.L.R. 6 (1936). In states like Tennessee which refuse to recognize
informal marriages, the doctrine of "ratification" is frequently not sanctioned.
COMPTON, CASES ON DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 69 n.17 (1951).

Tennessee has applied

it in the case of mental incapicity followed by a lucid interval. Cole v. Cole,
37 Tenn. 57, 70 Am. Dec. 269 (1857), but never in a case involving prior subsisting marriage, although there has been speculation that Tennessee might join
the minority of states and apply it to a bigamous marriage made in good faith
followed by removal of the disability. See Madewell v. United States, 84 F.
Supp. 329, 334 (E.D. Tenn. 1949); Jones v. General Motors Corp., 310 Mich.
605, 17 N.W.2d 770, 773 (.1945) (interpreting the Tennessee cases); Note, 3
VAND. L. REV. 610, 616-17 (1950).
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It has long been felt, however, that there is nothing to be gained
by bastardizing children whose parents have undertaken to marry.
As early as 1836, the legislature provided that dissolution of a marriage
should not affect the legitimacy of children.5 9 In 1932, the Code was
amended to save the legitimacy of children of annulled marriages. 60
In the present case, the Court construed this amendment to mean that
actual annulment proceedings are not necessary and that children of
any void or "null" marriage are legitimate. Actually the interpretation
given the Code in the present case is a broad and liberal one. Under
this interpretation, children of any ceremonial marriage would appear
to be legitimate. For example, in earlier cases the Court had held illegitimate those children who were born of marriages where one of
the parents had been divorced for adultery and had married his coadulterer during the lifetime of the innocent spouse.61 These holdings
were repudiated in the present case upon the ground that they were
not based upon the 1932 amendment or because, in one of the cases, 62
there was really no proof that the parents of the children had actually
attempted to marry.
The holding in the present case is clearly in line with the spirit of
the recent Tennessee legislation legitimizing illegitimate children
whose parents later marry, even though the subsequent marriage is
"illegal, void or voidable. ' 63 It places Tennessee in accord with the
most liberal states and would appear to be in line with modern thinking upon the social problems raised by illegal marriages. The holding
in no way condones the wrongdoing of the parents, but protects the
innocent children of those parents. Whether the Tennessee courts
would go so far as to hold legitimate children of a marriage between a
white person and a Negro still remains undecided, 64 but there would
seem to be no reason for distinguishing such a marriage from any other
type of void or illegal union.
DIVORCE AND ALIMONY

In the case of Troutt v. Troutt,,65 the Court of Appeals held that circumstantial evidence produced on the trial was sufficiently strong to
prove adultery on the part of a husband, entitling the wife to a divorce.
59. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1836, c. 26, § 7.

60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8453 (Williams 1934).

61. Jennings v. Jennings, 165 Tenn. 295, 54 S.W.2d 961 (1932); Bennett v.
Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148 (M.S. 1936). Such marriages are
prohibited by TENN.CODE ANN. § 8452 (Williams 1934).

62. Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148 (M.S. 1936).

63. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 70, codified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 9567 (Williams

Supp. 1953); Legis., 21 TENN. L. REV. 453 (1950). The statute was held consti-

tutional in Southern Ry. v. Sanders, 193 Tenn. 409, 246 S.W.2d 65 (1952), 5
VAND. L. REV. 838 (1952).
64. Such marriages are prohibited and made criminal by TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 8409, 8410 (Williams 1934).
65. 35 Tenn. App. 617, 250 S.W.2d 372 (W.S. 1952).
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Adultery as a ground for divorce must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, of course, but it need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt and may be, and generally must be, proved by circumstantial
evidence. 66 In the present case, private investigators and other witnesses testified as to the opportunity and inclination of the defendant
to commit adultery. Defendant sought to establish an alibi, but the
Court of Appeals refused to disturb the findings of the trial court,
which had had an opportunity personally to examine the witnesses.
One point of first impression dealt with in the case was the type of
appeal bond required in divorce cases. The trial court awarded the
wife $7,500.00 in alimony plus counsel fees. The husband appealed and
executed a cost bond in the amount of $250.00. The wife contended that
he should be required to give bond in the amount of the alimony plus
fees and cost. In an appeal from a chancery decree for a specified sum

67
of money, bond must be given for the amount of the decree plus costs.

Divorce proceedings are equitable in their nature,68 and it was contended that a full bond should be required. Earlier Tennessee cases
had so held when there was an appeal upon the question of the amount
69
of alimony.
In the present case, however, the defendant appealed not only from
the alimony awarded but also upon the ground that the complainant
was not entitled to a divorce. The Court of Appeals held that under
these circumstances only a cost bond would be required, since if there
was no ground for divorce, there could be no basis for alimony.
Earlier cases had stated that alimony and divorce are separate subjects, 70 but the Court of Appeals pointed out that they are not entirely

independent and that there cannot be alimony unless there is sufficient
ground for the granting of a divorce. The two questions being inextricably interwoven in this case, the Court reviewed both without
requiring a full bond.
In State ex rel. Wright v. Upchurch,7" a husband had been held in
deliberate contempt of an alimony decree and committed to jail. By
habeas corpus, he attacked the commitment order upon the ground
that it did not show on its face that he was able to pay alimony. While
recognizing that inability to pay is a defense to a contempt proceeding
in alimony cases, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in the present case on the ground that the writ of habeas corpus may not be used
as a substitute for appeal. The petitioner merely sought to make a col66. Sutton v. Sutton, 3 Tenn. App. 333 (W.S. 1926).

67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9045 (Williams 1934).
68. Broch v. Broch, 164 Tenn. 219, 47 S.W.2d 84 (1932);
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§ 622 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951).

CARUTSERS, HISTORY

69. Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S.W. 443 (1921); Chenault v. Chenault,

37 Tenn. 247 (1856).

70. Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938 (1922); Toncray v.

Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977 (1910).
71. 254 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1953).
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lateral attack on the commitment order from which he should have appealed. The Court pointed out, however, that alimony decrees remain
within the control of the divorce court and that the husband could
subsequently petition for a modification of the alimony order if circumstances warranted.
The 1953 General Assembly amended the alimony statutes to provide
that a court granting a divorce to a husband may divest out of the wife
and into the husband any interest which she has in jointly owned
property for which the husband has paid.72 The statute applies to both
real and personal property and expressly applies to property owned
as tenants by the entirety. Of course, all property, both real and personal, which is jointly owned by a husband and wife is owned as
tenants by the entirety unless otherwise specifically provided,7 3 but
upon the severance of the marriage, property owned by the entireties
becomes owned as tenants in common.74 The present statute does not
authorize alimony to be paid to a husband from the wife's estate, but
it does authorize the restoration to the husband of property for which
he has paid, an equitable result heretofore not attainable.75
The General Assembly also amended the divorce statutes by permitting members of the armed forces to make affidavits to divorce bills
before certain commissioned officers, even beyond the continental
76
limits of the United States.
ACTIONS FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM

The Supreme Court, in Napier v. Martin,7 indicated in dictum that
it would not recognize in Tennessee the right of a wife to sue for loss
of consortium. The husband had been injured while at work and had
collected workmen's compensation from his employer. The wife, however, brought this action at common law against the employer for loss
of services and consortium. The primary holding of the case was that
the compensation laws provided the exclusive remedy for the workman
and his family and that the employer was therefore not subject to any
further suit. In dictum, however, the Court said that such an action
by the wife does not exist in Tennessee "under the common law or by
statute." The plaintiff insisted that the Married Women's Emancipation
72. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 90, amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 8446 (Williams
1934).
73. Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W.2d 506 (1951); see note 88 infra.
74. Brown v. Brown, 160 Tenn. 685, 28 S.W.2d 350 (1930).
75. Ibid.
76. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 174, amending TENN. CODE

ANN.

§ 8431 (Williams

1934).

77. 250 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 976 (1953). See the comment on this case in the Exclusiveness of Remedy section of the Workmen's
Compensation article.
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Act7 8 conferred upon a wife the right to bring such an action, but the
Court declined to rule upon this point.
The majority of states still do not permit the wife to bring suit for
loss of consortium for tortious hijury to the husband, even under the
emancipation statutes,7 9 but there is authority to the contrary.80 Logically, there would seem to be little reason to deny the right to her.
The wife is not obligated to furnish medical expenses or necessaries
to the husband. Nevertheless, as hereinafter discussed, the concept of
consortium includes society, services, sexual relationships, and so forth.
It would seem that the wife should be afforded a remedy for a negligent interference with these matters just as readily as is a husband.
Where there is an intentional interference with the marriage relationship, as in an action for alienation of affections, the Tennessee courts
have construed the Emancipation Act to permit the wife to sue as well
as the husband.8 ' It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court commented
adversely upon her right to sue for negligently inflicted injuries to her
husband, particularly since a decision upon the point was not required
in the case.
In the case of All v. John Gerber Company,82 the Court of Appeals
discussed fully the elements that enter into the concept of consortium.
In that case, the wife sued a beauty parlor for injuries sustained while
she was being given a permanent wave. The husband sued for loss of
consortium and for medical expenses. In the trial, the court charged
the jury that the measure of his damages was the amount of medical
expenses which he had incurred on behalf of his wife. The Court of
Appeals held that this charge was erroneous, inasmuch as a husband,
in an action for loss of consortium, is entitled to recover for actual
services of his wife which he has lost and also for the loss of her companionship, society, sexual relationship and the normal contribution
which she renders to the home life. The Court said that, in recovering
for loss of services, the husband must prove in detail the actual services
lost. However, there are other elements in the consortium, and proof
of lost services is not essential to recovery for these. The value of coilsortium depends upon the jury's estimate of the loss sustained in the
home life in its normal conditions and surroundings.8 3 The husband
78. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 126, codified in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8460 et seq.
(Williams 1934).
79. COMPTON, CASES ON Doa EsT c RELATIONS 372 n.14 (1951); RESTATEMENT,
TORTs § 695 (1938).
80. H-itaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950), 4 VAND. L. REv. 358 (1951); Passalacqua v. Draper, 199 Misc. 827,
104 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1951); COMPTON,
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372 n.14 (1951).
81. Wilson v. Bryant, 167 Tenn. 107, 67 S.W.2d 133 (1934); Archer v. Archer,
31 Tenn. App. 657, 219 S.W.2d 919 (E.S. 1947).

82. 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
83. See Notes, 133 A.L.R. 1156 (1941), 21 A.L.R. 1517 (1922).
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was held not entitled to recover for his own mental anguish in the
action for loss of consortium, however.
Although the charge of the trial court was held erroneous, the Court
of Appeals did not reverse, inasmuch as the jury allowed the husband
a sum substantially in excess of any and all damages proved. The
Court felt that under the circumstances the error was not prejudicial.
PARENT AND CHILD

The Supreme Court refused in Ownby v. Kleyhammer8 to modify
the position which it has consistently taken on the right of a minor to
sue its parent for tort. In this case, the minor was a guest in a car
driven by his father but owned by a third party. There was no allegation that the father was employed in any way by the owner. As a
result of the father's negligence in driving the car, the child was injured. His suit against the owner of the car was dismissed on the
ground that, if recovery were allowed, the owner would have an action
over against the father, thus indirectly permitting the child to sue his
parent.
Although the Tennessee position is very conservative on this point,
the case is in accordance with previous holdings which, for similar
reasons, denied the right of a child to sue the employer of his negligent parent85 or the wife to sue the employer of her negligent spouse. 5
TENAWcy BY THE ENTIRETY

In Hardin v. Chapman,87 the Court of Appeals held that a deed conveying property to "H. H. Brown and wife, Mary Brown, equally and
jointly" was sufficient to create the estate of tenancy by the entirety.
It was contended that such a conveyance was effective only to make
the parties tenants in common. In the habendum clause of the deed,
however, the property was conveyed to "H. H. Brown and Mary
Brown, their heirs and assigns forever," and in the covenants the same
language was used. There was no extrinsic proof as to the intention
of the grantor or grantees with respect to the title. The Court followed
the general rule that, when property is conveyed to a husband and
wife jointly, it is presumed that a tenancy by the entirety is created
in the absence of contrary wording or proof of contrary intention. 88
.84. 250 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1952), 22 TENN.L. R.v.1050 (1953).
85. Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622, 162 A.L.R. 571 (1945);

Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 15 Tenn. App. 570 (W.S. 1932).
86. Fagg v. Benton Motor Co., 193 Tenn. 562, 246 S.W.2d 978 (1952); cf.
Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932).
87. 255 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).

88. Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn. 232, 133 S.W.2d 491 (1939).
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CONSERVATORS OF ESTATES

The 1953 General Assembly provided a means whereby conservators
may be appointed in county or probate courts for the estates of persons
who are incapable of managing their own estates because of age or disability.89 Such appointment may be made upon petition of the friends
of such persons. Provisions are made for notice, hearing and the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The conservator is given all of the
powers and duties of a guardian of a minor except as to custody. Bond
equivalent to a guardian's bond is required, and the person whose
property is placed in the conservator's hands has only the capacity of
a minor to enter into contracts. There is no requirement of a jury trial
or inquest of insanity. The appointment and the removal of the conservator are left to the discretion of the county or probate judge.
89. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 158.

